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The Parking Lot Problem

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  • Maria Arbatskaya

    (Department of Economics, Emory University)

  • Kaushik Mukhopadhaya

    (Department of Economics, Emory University)

  • Eric Rasmusen

    (CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo and Kelley School of Business, Indiana University)

Abstract

If there is queueing for an underpriced good, the queueing can eat up the entire surplus, eliminating the social value of the good. An implication is that there is a discontinuity in social welfare between "enough" and "not enough" for certain goods such as parking spaces. This implies that if there is uncertainty in the number of demanders, the amount of the good should be set well in excess of the mean demand

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File URL: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2001/2001cf119.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo in its series CIRJE F-Series with number CIRJE-F-119.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2001cf119

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References

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  1. Leo K. Simon and Maxwell B. Stinchcombe., 1987. "Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies," Economics Working Papers 8746, University of California at Berkeley.
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  3. Posner, Richard A. & Avery, Christopher & Jolls, Christine & Roth, Alvin, 2001. "The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks," Scholarly Articles 2623748, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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  8. Arnott, Richard & Rowse, John, 1999. "Modeling Parking," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 97-124, January.
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  16. Roth, Alvin E & Xing, Xiaolin, 1994. "Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 992-1044, September.
  17. Porter, Richard C, 1977. "On the Optimal Size of Underpriced Facilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(4), pages 753-60, September.
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  19. Cullis, John G & Jones, Philip R, 1986. "Rationing by Waiting Lists: An Implication," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(1), pages 250-56, March.
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  22. Clark, Derek J & Riis, Christian, 1998. "Competition over More Than One Prize," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 276-89, March.
  23. Anderson, Simon P. & de Palma, Andre, 2004. "The economics of pricing parking," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-20, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Martijn B.W. Kobus & Jos N. van Ommeren & Hans R.A. Koster & Piet Rietveld, 2013. "Congestible Goods and Hoarding: A Test based on Students' Use of University Computers," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-083/VIII, Tinbergen Institute.
  2. Hasker, Kevin & Inci, Eren, 2012. "Free Parking for All in Shopping Malls," MPRA Paper 35978, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Michael D. Grubb & Paul Oyer, 2008. "Who Benefits from Tax-Advantaged Employee Benefits?: Evidence from University Parking," NBER Working Papers 14062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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