Exclusive Dealing: Before Bork, and Beyond
AbstractAntitrust scholars have come to accept the basic ideas about exclusive dealing that Bork articulated in The Antitrust Paradox. Indeed, they have even extended his list of reasons why exclusive dealing can promote economic efficiency. Yet they have also taken up his challenge to explain how exclusive dealing could possibly cause harm, and have modelled a variety of special cases where it does. Some (albeit not all) of these are sufficiently plausible to be useful to prosecutors and judges.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy in its series Working Papers with number 2013-11.
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L0 - Industrial Organization - - General
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-12-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2013-12-15 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HME-2013-12-15 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-HPE-2013-12-15 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2013-12-15 (Law & Economics)
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