Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information

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Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information

Author Info

Rasmusen, Eric

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Eric B Rasmusen

Abstract

Politicians trade off the cost of acquiring and processing information against the benefit of being reelected. Lobbyists may possess private information upon which politicians would like to rely without the effort of verification. If the politician does not try to verify, however, the lobbyist has no incentive to be truthful. This is modeled as a game in which the lobbyist lobbies to show his conviction that the electorate is on his side. In equilibrium, sometimes the politician investigates, and sometimes the information is false. The lobbyists and the electorate benefit from the possibility of lobbying when the politician would otherwise vote in ignorance, but not when he would otherwise acquire his own information. The politician benefits in either case. Lobbying is most socially useful when the politician's investigation costs are high, when he is more certain of the electorate's views, and when the issue is less important. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 77 (1993)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 899-913
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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:77:y:1993:i:4:p:899-913

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Sam Bucovetsky & Amihai Glazer, 2006. "How To Avoid Awarding a Valuable Asset," Working Papers 050619, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Amihai Glazer, 2006. "Predicting Committee Action," Working Papers 050621, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Matthias Dahm & Robert Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2009. "Lobbying of Firms by Voters," Working Papers 080926, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Matthias Dahm & Robert Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2009. "Lobbying of Firms by Voters," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 09-068/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
Ashish Chaturvedi & Amihai Glazer, 2005. "Competitive Proposals of Policies by Lobbies," Working Papers 050614, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Joan Esteban & Debraj Ray, 2006. "Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 257-279, March. [Downloadable!]
Randolph Sloof & Frans van Winden, 2000. "Show Them Your Teeth First!," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 81-120, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Eric Rasmusen, 1996. "Choosing Among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games," Game Theory and Information 9607004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Derek Pyne, 1997. "Microfoundations of Influencing Public Opinion Lobbying and Voting for Trade Policies," Working Papers 1997_03, York University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]

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