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Show Them Your Teeth First!

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  • Randolph Sloof
  • Frans van Winden

Abstract

This paper investigates the choice of an interestgroup between lobbying (``words'') and pressure(``actions'') in order to influence a policymaker. Both lobbying and pressure are modeled asstrategic means of transmitting information that isrelevant to the policymaker. However, only pressure isdirectly costly to the policymaker. The interactionbetween the interest group and the policymaker isframed as a repeated signaling game. In equilibriumpressure – in contrast to lobbying – only occurswhen the interest group's reputation is sufficientlylow, and always improves its reputation. It is shownthat (repeated) lobbying cannot completely substitutefor pressure, and that the interest group may beforced to sustain its reputation through lobbying. Weconclude that pressure is typically used to build upa reputation, lobbying to maintain a reputation. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 104 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 81-120

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:104:y:2000:i:1:p:81-120

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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References

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  1. Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1993. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All-Pay Auction," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 289-94, March.
  2. Moore, Michael O. & Suranovic, Steven M., 1992. "Lobbying vs. administered protection : Endogenous industry choice and national welfare," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3-4), pages 289-303, May.
  3. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September.
  4. Noldeke, Georg & van Damme, Eric, 1990. "Signalling in a Dynamic Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(1), pages 1-23, January.
  5. Potters, J.J.M. & Winden, F. van, 1990. "Modelling political pressure as transmission of information," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-223991, Tilburg University.
  6. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-73373, Tilburg University.
  7. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
  8. Damme, E.E.C. van & Nöldeke, G., 1990. "Signaling in a dynamic labor market," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154421, Tilburg University.
  9. Potters, Jan & van Winden, Frans, 1992. " Lobbying and Asymmetric Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(3), pages 269-92, October.
  10. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  11. Masso, Jordi, 1996. "A Note on Reputation: More on the Chain-Store Paradox," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 55-81, July.
  12. Banks, Jeffrey S & Sobel, Joel, 1987. "Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(3), pages 647-61, May.
  13. Cho, In-Koo, 1993. "Strategic Stability in Repeated Signaling Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 107-21.
  14. Hoyt, William H. & Toma, Eugenia Froedge, 1989. "State mandates and interest group lobbying," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 199-213, March.
  15. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August.
  16. Harrington Jr. , Joseph E., 1993. "The Impact of Reelection Pressures on the Fulfillment of Campaign Promises," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 71-97, January.
  17. Rasmusen, Eric, 1993. " Lobbying When the Decisionmaker Can Acquire Independent Information," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 899-913, December.
  18. James M. Snyder, 1991. "On Buying Legislatures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(2), pages 93-109, 07.
  19. Susanne Lohmann, 1995. "A Signaling Model Of Competitive Political Pressures," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(3), pages 181-206, November.
  20. Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Show Them Your Teeth First! A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Lobbying and Pressure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 81-120, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Javier A. Prado Domínguez & Antonio García Lorenzo, 2010. "Competencia e incentivos a la cooperación en la interacción de grupos de interés que pretenden aumentar su influencia política directa: ¿cuál es la importancia de la presión política?," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, vol. 192(1), pages 105-125, March.
  2. David Gill & Christine Lipsmeyer, 2005. "Soft money and hard choices: Why political parties might legislate against soft money donations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 411-438, June.
  3. Gullberg, Anne Therese, 2008. "Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and environmental interest groups in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2954-2962, August.
  4. DAHM, Matthias & PORTEIRO, Nicolas, 2003. "The political economy of interest groups: pressure and information," CORE Discussion Papers 2003057, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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