Show Them Your Teeth First!
AbstractThis paper investigates the choice of an interestgroup between lobbying (``words'') and pressure(``actions'') in order to influence a policymaker. Both lobbying and pressure are modeled asstrategic means of transmitting information that isrelevant to the policymaker. However, only pressure isdirectly costly to the policymaker. The interactionbetween the interest group and the policymaker isframed as a repeated signaling game. In equilibriumpressure – in contrast to lobbying – only occurswhen the interest group's reputation is sufficientlylow, and always improves its reputation. It is shownthat (repeated) lobbying cannot completely substitutefor pressure, and that the interest group may beforced to sustain its reputation through lobbying. Weconclude that pressure is typically used to build upa reputation, lobbying to maintain a reputation. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2000
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 104 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
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