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Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure

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Author Info
Matthias Dahm ()
Nicolás Porteiro ()

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Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00355-007-0264-x
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.

Volume (Year): 30 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
Pages: 531-559
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Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:4:p:531-559

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Austen-Smith, David, 1998. "Allocating Access for Information and Contributions," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(2), pages 277-303, October.
  3. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
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  4. Sloof, Randolph & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Show Them Your Teeth First! A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Lobbying and Pressure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 81-120, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Nicolas Porteiro & Matthias Dahm, 2004. "The Political Economy of Interest Groups: Pressure and Information," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 352, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  6. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian L, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 643-51, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Matejka, M. & Onderstal, S. & De Waegenaere, A., 2002. "The effectiveness of caps on political lobbying," Discussion Paper 44, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  8. Baker, Scott & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2005. "Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 173-94, April.
  9. Morten Bennedsen & Sven E. Feldmann, 2002. "Lobbying Legislatures," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(4), pages 919-948, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C.G., 1992. "Rigging the Lobbying Process: An Application of the All- Pay Auction," Papers 9-92-2, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
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  11. Laffont, J.-J., 1999. "Political Economy, Information and Incentives," Papers 99.516, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
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  12. Paul R. Milgrom, 1981. "Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 380-391, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Bennedsen, Morten & Feldmann, Sven E., 2006. "Informational lobbying and political contributions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(4-5), pages 631-656, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Lohmann, Susanne, 1995. " Information, Access, and Contributions: A Signaling Model of Lobbying," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 85(3-4), pages 267-84, December.
  17. Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Disclosures and Asset Returns," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(1), pages 105-133, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Matthias Dahm & Nicolas Porteiro, 2005. "Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform," Discussion Papers 1408, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Biased Contests," Working Papers 06.21, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008. "Biased contests," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 55-67, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2006. "Side Effects of Campaign Finance Reform," Working Papers 06.15, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Cotton, Christopher, 2007. "Informational Lobbying and Competition for Access," MPRA Paper 1842, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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