Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.
Volume (Year): 141 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332
Public goods; Central and local government; Median voter; Bureaucracy; Partisan politicians; Lobbying; Flypaper effect; D7; H72;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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