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The Equilibrium Size of a Budget-maximizing Bureau: A Note on Niskanen's Theory of Bureaucracy

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Breton, Albert
Wintrobe, Ronald

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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 83 (1975)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 195-207
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:83:y:1975:i:1:p:195-207

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  1. Gervan Fearon, 2004. "Public sector wage settlement and the threat of outsourcing," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 32(3), pages 161-174, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dahlberg, Matz & Mörk, Eva, 2005. "Public Employment and the Double Role of Bureaucrats," Working Paper Series 2005:3, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Miltos Makris, 2003. "Administrative Bureaus with Standard Operating Procedures," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 03/062, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
  4. Samarth Vaidya, 2004. "Bureaucratic Provision: Influencing vs. Lying," Econometric Society 2004 Australasian Meetings 251, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  5. Swank Otto H., 2000. "Seeking information: the role of information providers in the policy decision process," Public Economics 0004004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Miltiadis Makris, 2006. "Political authority, expertise and government bureaucracies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 267-284, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Michele Santoni & Silvia Fedeli, 2000. "Endogenous Institutions in Bureaucratic Compliance Games," Departemental Working Papers 2000-03, Department of Economics University of Milan Italy. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Reiner Eichenberger & Mark Schelker, 2007. "Independent and competing agencies: An effective way to control government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 130(1), pages 79-98, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Dieter Schmidtchen & Bernard Steunenberg, . "European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2002-1-1040, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  10. José Casas-Pardo & Miguel Puchades-Navarro, 2001. "A Critical Comment on Niskanen's Model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 147-167, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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