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The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters

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Author Info
Stanley L. Winer () (Department of Economics, Carleton University)
Walter Hettich () (Department of Economics, California State University at Fullerton)

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Abstract

In this paper we review both positive and normative aspects of taxation. We examine how to study why taxes and revenue structures have taken their present form and why they are used in a particular way as part of the democratic process. In addition, we also consider the classic normative questions, namely what makes a good tax system and how to assess the efficiency of taxation. In dealing with both aspects of the tax literature, we attempt to set out a plan for a more complete and comprehensive analysis of taxation in the face of collective choice than is attempted in most of the available literature on fiscal issues.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number 02-11.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 03 Aug 2002
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Publication status: Published: Carleton Working Paper
Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:02-11

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Related research
Keywords: taxation; revenue structure; collective choice; democratic process; optimal tax.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation

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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. J. Stephen Ferris +, 2006. "Just how much bigger is government in Canada?," Carleton Economic Papers 06-04, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 12 Jul 2006. [Downloadable!]
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