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The Political Economy of Taxation: Positive and Normative Analysis when Collective Choice Matters

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Abstract

In this paper we review both positive and normative aspects of taxation. We examine how to study why taxes and revenue structures have taken their present form and why they are used in a particular way as part of the democratic process. In addition, we also consider the classic normative questions, namely what makes a good tax system and how to assess the efficiency of taxation. In dealing with both aspects of the tax literature, we attempt to set out a plan for a more complete and comprehensive analysis of taxation in the face of collective choice than is attempted in most of the available literature on fiscal issues.

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File URL: http://www1.carleton.ca/economics/ccms/wp-content/ccms-files/cep02-11.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number 02-11.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 03 Aug 2002
Date of revision: 2004
Publication status: Published: Revised version in Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Volume 1, ed. Charles K. Rowley and Friedrich Schneider, Kluwer Academic, 2004, pp. 173–190
Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:02-11

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Keywords: taxation; revenue structure; collective choice; democratic process; optimal tax.;

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