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Leviathan and Fiscal Illusion in Local Government Overlapping Jurisdictions

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  • Rebecca J. Campbell

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    Abstract

    This paper integrates two models of local government behavior, leviathan and fiscal illusion, into the framework of overlapping jurisdictions. Estimation of the leviathan and fiscal illusion variables without accounting for vertical effects between overlapping jurisdictions results in overestimation of the horizontal effects. Using a median voter model and municipal and county data we find support for the leviathan model using traditional tests. These effects are largely offset, however, when the test is set within the context of the vertical relationship. We find that municipal per capita expenditures and county per capita expenditures are symmetrically complementary.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 120 (2004)
    Issue (Month): 3_4 (09)
    Pages: 301-329

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:120:y:2004:i:3_4:p:301-329

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    Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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    Cited by:
    1. Benoît Le Maux, 2009. "Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 447-465, December.
    2. Hanson, Andrew & Schnier, Kurt & Turnbull, Geoffrey K., 2012. "Drive 'Til You Qualify: Credit quality and household location," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 63-77.
    3. Peter Haug, 2009. "Shadow Budgets, Fiscal Illusion and Municipal Spending: The Case of Germany," IWH Discussion Papers 9, Halle Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Eric J. Brunner & Stephen L. Ross & Rebecca K. Simonsen, 2013. "Homeowners, Renters and the Political Economy of Property Taxation," Working papers 2013-30, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    5. Geoffrey Turnbull & Gyusuck Geon, 2006. "Local government internal structure, external constraints and the median voter," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 487-506, December.
    6. Marie-Estelle Binet & Alain Guengant & Matthieu Leprince, 2012. "Overlapping jurisdictions and demand for local public services: does spatial heterogeneity matter?," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 201213, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
    7. Stephen Billings & Thomas Thibodeau, 2011. "Intrametropolitan Decentralization: Is Government Structure Capitalized in Residential Property Values?," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 42(4), pages 416-450, May.
    8. Sanandaji, Tino & Wallace, Björn, 2010. "Fiscal Illusion and Fiscal Obfuscation:An Empirical Study of Tax Perception in Sweden," Working Paper Series 837, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    9. Llanto, Gilberto M. & Kelekar, Uma, 2013. "Perspectives on Health Decentralization and Interjurisdictional Competition among Local Governments in the Philippines," Discussion Papers DP 2013-20, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.

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