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Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States

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Author Info
John Bradbury ()
W. Crain

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Abstract

In accordance with the median voter theorem the median legislator is decisive in representative democracy. If the preferences of the median legislator differ from the preferences of the median voter in the polity, fiscal policy choices will predictably diverge from those favored by the median voter. This paper seeks to identify the median district (and therein the preferences driving the median legislator) in American State legislatures. Using economic characteristics of constituents, we find substantial differences between the median district and the statewide median. As the income of the median district rises above the median income of the polity, government expenditures increase. In addition, the degree to which income is skewed across legislative districts affects spending for redistribution programs. Finally, we find that direct democracy procedures, which allow the statewide median voter to check legislative decisions, limit the impact of differences between the district and polity medians. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-005-3058-7
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 125 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 385-407
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:3:p:385-407

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Poterba, James M, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Policy in the U.S. States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 395-400, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Bradbury, John Charles & Crain, W. Mark, 2001. "Legislative organization and government spending: cross-country evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 309-325, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Alesina, Alberto & Rodrik, Dani, 1994. "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 465-90, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Per Krusell & Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 1999. "On the Size of U.S. Government: Political Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1156-1181, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Matsusaka, John G, 1992. "Economics of Direct Legislation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 541-71, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Goodman, Robert P, 1973. "Private Demands for Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 280-96, June.
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  7. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "The elusive median voter," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 143-170, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Pommerehne, Werner W., 1978. "Institutional approaches to public expenditure : Empirical evidence from Swiss municipalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 255-280, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1994. "Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 600-621, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. John R. Lott & Jr. & Lawrence W. Kenny, 1999. "Did Women's Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1163-1198, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Romer, Thomas & Rosenthal, Howard, 1979. "Bureaucrats versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 563-87, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Pommerehne, Werner W & Frey, Bruno S, 1978. "Bureaucratic Behavior in Democracy: A Case Study," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 33(1-2), pages 98-112.
  14. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-43, December.
  15. Peltzman, Sam, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 327-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. James M. Poterba, 1997. "Do Budget Rules Work?," NBER Working Papers 5550, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Bohn, Henning & Inman, Robert P., 1996. "Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: evidence from the U.S. states," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 13-76, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Husted, Thomas A & Kenny, Lawrence W, 1997. "The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 54-82, February.
  19. Matsusaka, John G, 1995. "Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last 30 Years," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(3), pages 587-623, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Thomas Gilligan & John Matsusaka, 2006. "Public choice principles of redistricting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 381-398, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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