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Information about:
W. Mark Crain

Personal Details | Affiliation | Works
This is information that was supplied by W. Crain in registering through RePEc. If you are W. Mark Crain , you may change this information at RePEc. Or if you are not registered and would like to be listed as well, register at RePEc. When you register or update your RePEc registration, you may identify the papers and articles you have authored.

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Personal Details

First Name: W.
Middle Name: Mark
Last Name: Crain
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pcr35

Email:
Homepage:
http://ww2.lafayette.edu/~crainm/
Postal Address: William E. Simon Professor of Political Economy Department of Business and Economics Simon Center Lafayette College Easton, PA 18042
Phone: 610/330-5315

Affiliation

(in no particular order)

Works

|
Articles | Access and download statistics | Citations (if any)|
Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF


Articles

  1. Nicole Crain & W. Crain, 2006. "Terrorized economies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 317-349, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  2. John Bradbury & W. Crain, 2005. "Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 385-407, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  3. W. Crain & J. O’Roark, 2004. "The impact of performance-based budgeting on state fiscal performance," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 167-186, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  4. Joseph M. Johnson & W. Mark Crain, 2004. "Effects of Term Limits on Fiscal Performance: Evidence from Democratic Nations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(1_2), pages 73-90, 04. [Downloadable!]

  5. W. Crain & Robert Tollison, 2002. "Consumer Choice and the Popular Music Industry: A Test of the Superstar Theory," Empirica, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 1-9, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  6. W. Mark Crain, 2002. "Sources of inefficiency in representative democracy: Evidence on public investments across nations," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 171-181, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  7. Crain, W Mark, 2001. "The Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Redistricting: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 193-221, January.

  8. Bradbury, John Charles & Crain, W. Mark, 2001. "Legislative organization and government spending: cross-country evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 309-325, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  9. Crain, W Mark & Lee, Katherine J, 1999. "Economic Growth Regressions for the American States: A Sensitivity Analysis," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 37(2), pages 242-57, April.

  10. Crain, W Mark, 1999. "Districts, Diversity, and Fiscal Biases: Evidence from the American States," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(2), pages 675-98, October.

  11. Crain, W. Mark & Crain, Nicole Verrier, 1998. "Fiscal consequences of budget baselines," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 421-436, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  12. Crain, W. Mark & Tollison, Robert D., 1997. "Economics and the architecture of popular music," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 185-205, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  13. Crain, W Mark & Sullivan, John T, 1997. " Committee Characteristics and Re-election Margins: An Empirical Investigation of the US House," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 93(3-4), pages 271-85, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Published as:

  14. Crain, W Mark & Muris, Timothy J, 1995. "Legislative Organization of Fiscal Policy," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 311-33, October.

  15. Crain, W Mark & Oakley, Lisa K, 1995. "The Politics of Infrastructure," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-17, April.

  16. Coker, David C & Crain, W Mark, 1994. " Legislative Committees as Loyalty-Generating Institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 195-221, December.

  17. Crain, W. Mark & Tollison, Robert D., 1993. "Time inconsistency and fiscal policy : Empirical analysis of U.S. States, 1969-89," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 153-159, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  18. Crain, W Mark & Messenheimer, Harold C & Tollison, Robert D, 1993. "The Probability of Being President," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 75(4), pages 683-89, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  19. Crain, W Mark & Goff, Brian L, 1986. "Televising Legislatures: An Economic Analysis," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29(2), pages 405-21, October.

  20. Crain, W Mark & Leavens, Donald R & Tollison, Robert D, 1986. "Final Voting in Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 833-41, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  21. Crain, W. Mark & Shughart, William II & Tollison, Robert D., 1984. "The convergence of satisficing to marginalism : An empirical test," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 5(3-4), pages 375-385. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  22. Crain, W. Mark & Deaton, Thomas H. & Holcombe, Randall G. & Tollison, Robert D., 1981. "Rational choice and the taxation of sin : Reply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 261-263, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  23. Crain, W Mark & Zardkoohi, Asghar, 1980. "X-Inefficiency and Nonpecuniary Rewards in a Rent-Seeking Society: A Neglected Issue in the Property Rights Theory of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 784-92, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  24. Crain, W Mark & Zardkoohi, Asghar, 1980. "The Exchange Value of Nonpecuniary Benefits," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 692-700, October.

  25. Crain, W Mark & Deaton, Thomas & Tollison, Robert D, 1979. "Toenote to a Footnote," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 307-09, April.

  26. Crain, W Mark & Tollison, Robert D, 1978. "On the Sufficient Conditions for Wealth-Maximizing Conduct," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 31(3), pages 500-503.

  27. Crain, W Mark & Zardkoohi, Asghar, 1978. "A Test of the Property-Rights Theory of the Firm: Water Utilities in the United States," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 395-408, October.

  28. Crain, W Mark & Deaton, Thomas H & Tollison, Robert D, 1977. "Legislators as Taxicabs: On the Value of Seats in the U.S. House of Representatives," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(2), pages 298-302, April.

  29. Crain, Mark & Deaton, Thomas & Holcombe, Randall & Tollison, Robert, 1977. "Rational choice and the taxation of sin," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 239-245, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  30. Crain, W Mark & Tollison, Robert D, 1977. "Attenuated Property Rights and the Market for Governors," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 205-11, April.

  31. Crain, W Mark, 1977. "On the Structure and Stability of Political Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(4), pages 829-42, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

  32. Crain, W Mark, 1977. "An Empirical Estimate of the Income Elasticity of Political Participation," Kyklos, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 30(1), pages 122-25.

  33. Crain, William Mark & Ekelund, Robert B, Jr, 1976. "Chadwick and Demsetz on Competition and Regulation," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 149-62, April.

  34. Crain, William Mark & Tollison, Robert D, 1976. "Campaign Expenditures and Political Competition," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 177-88, April.


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This page was last updated on 2008-7-15.


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