Attenuated Property Rights and the Market for Governors

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Attenuated Property Rights and the Market for Governors

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Crain, W Mark
Tollison, Robert D

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Abstract

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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 20 (1977)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 205-11
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:20:y:1977:i:1:p:205-11

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John Lott, 2006. "Campaign finance reform and electoral competition," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(3), pages 263-300, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Lars P. Feld & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2004. "Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-federal Jurisdictions," Marburg Working Papers on Economics 200421, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars P. Feld, 2004. "Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-federal Jurisdictions," CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-15, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]
- Christoph A. Schaltegger & Lars Feld, 2004. "Do Large Cabinets Favor Large Governments? Evidence from Swiss Sub-Federal Jurisdictions," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1993. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," NBER Working Papers 4575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 769-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Joaquín Artés & Enrique Viñuela, 2007. "Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations: an empirical analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 41-55, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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