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Is the Median Voter Decisive? Evidence of 'Ends Against the Middle' From Referenda Voting Patterns

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Author Info

  • Eric J. Brunner

    (Quinnipiac University)

  • Stephen L. Ross

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

This paper examines whether the voter with the median income is decisive in local spending decisions. Previous tests have relied on cross-sectional data while we make use of a pair of California referenda to estimate a first difference specification. The referenda proposed to lower the required vote share for passing local educational bonding initiatives from 67 to 50 percent and 67 to 55 percent, respectively. We find that voters rationally consider future public service decisions when deciding how to vote on voting rules, but the empirical evidence strongly suggests that an income percentile below the median is decisive for majority voting rules. This finding is consistent with high income voters with weak demand for public educational services voting with the poor against increases in public spending on education.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Connecticut, Department of Economics in its series Working papers with number 2009-02.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2009
Date of revision: May 2010
Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2009-02

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Related research

Keywords: Median Voter Hypothesis; Voting; Referenda; Education Spending;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Berardino Cesi, 2009. "Local public education and childless voting : the arising of an "ends with the middle" coalition," THEMA Working Papers 2009-07, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  2. Peter Haug, 2009. "Shadow Budgets, Fiscal Illusion and Municipal Spending: The Case of Germany," IWH Discussion Papers 9, Halle Institute for Economic Research.

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