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Economic incentives and political institutions: Spending and voting in school budget referenda

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Author Info
Romer, Thomas
Rosenthal, Howard
Munley, Vincent G.
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 49 (1992)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
Pages: 1-33
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:49:y:1992:i:1:p:1-33

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  1. Dennis Epple & Thomas Romer & Holger Sieg, 1999. "The Tiebout Hypothesis and Majority Rule: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 6977, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Eric J. Brunner & Stephen L. Ross, 2009. "Is the Median Voter Decisive? Evidence of 'Ends Against the Middle' From Referenda Voting Patterns," Working papers 2009-02, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Justina A.V. Fischer, 2005. "The Impact of Direct Democracy on Public Education: Performance of Swiss Students in Reading," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2005 2005-10, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen. [Downloadable!]
  4. José Cruz, 2001. "An empirical application of the median voter model and of the interest group influence model to the Portuguese and Galician municipalities," ERSA conference papers ersa01p25, European Regional Science Association. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sven Fischer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  6. Eric J. Brunner & Stephen L. Ross, 2007. "How Decisive Is the Decisive Voter?," Working papers 2007-28, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
  7. Dahlberg, Matz & Lundqvist, Heléne & Mörk, Eva, 2008. "Intergovernmental Grants and Bureaucratic Power," Working Paper Series 2008:12, Uppsala University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Sven Fischer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  9. Joshua Hall, 2006. "Fiscal competition and tax instrument choice: the role of income inequality," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 8(12), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  10. Lars P. Feld & John G. Matsusaka, 2000. "Budget Referendums and Government Spending: Evidence from Swiss," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  11. Hans Bonesrønning & Torberg Falch & Bjarne Strøm, 2003. "Teacher Sorting, Teacher Quality, and Student Composition: Evidence from Norway," Working Paper Series 3403, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology. [Downloadable!]
  12. Fischer, Justina A.V., 2007. "The Impact of Direct Democracy on Public Education: Evidence for Swiss Students in Reading, Mathematics and Natural Science," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 688, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. David M. Cutler & Douglas W. Elmendorf & Richard J. Zeckhauser, 1997. "Restraining the Leviathan: Property Tax Limitation in Massachusetts," NBER Working Papers 6196, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Thomas J. Nechyba, 1996. "A Computable General Equilibrium Model of Intergovernmental Aid," NBER Working Papers 5420, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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