Testing the Median Voter Model and Moving Beyond its Limits: Do Characteristics of Politicians Matter?
AbstractWe exploit a natural measure of congruence between politicians and their constituency' bnm bnnb fgvhjuis preferences to directly quantify the extent of legislative shirking and evaluate the mechanism of the median voter model. The median voter model explains the behavior of politicians with respect to revealed preferences of their constituency about 18.8 percentage points better than a random decision benchmark. However, it fails to account for a substantial part of its theoretical prediction of convergence. Nevertheless, competition for voters under majority rule crowds out individual charact eristics and party affiliations as potential factors which explain legislative shirking.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2013-05.
Date of creation: Mar 2013
Date of revision:
Constituents' Preferences; Median Voter Model; Political Economy;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-08-31 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2013-08-31 (Positive Political Economics)
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- Niklas Potrafke, 2013.
"Evidence on the political principal-agent problem fromvoting on public finance for concert halls,"
Ifo Working Paper Series
Ifo Working Paper No. 164, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
- Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 215-238, September.
- Potrafke, Niklas, 2013. "Evidence on the political principal-agent problem from voting on public finance for concert halls," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 19268, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Niklas Potrafke, 2013. "Evidence on the Political Principal-Agent Problem from Voting on Public Finance for Concert Halls," CESifo Working Paper Series 4306, CESifo Group Munich.
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