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A Contribution to the Political Economy of Government Size: 'Demand', 'Supply' and 'Political Influence'

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Author Info
George Tridimas () (School of Economics and Politics University of Ulster, Shore Road, Newtownabbey)
Stanley L. Winer () (School of Public Policy and Administration, Carleton University)

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Abstract

This paper contributes to the understanding of empirically-oriented work on the size of government by integrating the analysis of three basic elements: (i) the 'demand' for government stemming in part from attempts to coercively redistribute, often analyzed in a median voter framework; (ii) the 'supply' of taxable activities emphasized in Leviathan and other models of taxation; and (iii) the distribution of 'political influence' when influence and economic interests are distinct. The role of the first two factors have been considered in recent empirical studies of government growth by Ferris and West (1996) and Kau and Rubin (2002). Estimates of the effect of unequal political influence on the size of government have been provided by Mueller and Stratmann (2003). We combine all three elements in a spatial voting framework of a sort that has not been well explored, and use the comparative static properties of the integrative model to shed light on the analytical and empirical literatures.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Carleton University, Department of Economics in its series Carleton Economic Papers with number 04-04.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2004
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Publication status: Published: Carleton Economic Paper
Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:04-04

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Related research
Keywords: size of government; coercive redistribution; home production; political influence; probabilistic voting;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
H0 - Public Economics - - General
H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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  3. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Roberto Perotti & Massimo Rostagno, 2002. "Electoral Systems And Public Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(2), pages 609-657, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
  7. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521622912 is not listed on IDEAS
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  15. Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, 2000. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1121-1161, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Tridimas, George, 2001. " The Economics and Politics of the Structure of Public Expenditure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 299-316, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • Boadway, Robin & Keen, Michael, 2000. "Redistribution," Handbook of Income Distribution, in: A.B. Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (ed.), Handbook of Income Distribution, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 677-789 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  19. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Goodman, Robert P, 1973. "Private Demands for Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 280-96, June.
    Other versions:
  20. Baumol, William J, 1972. "Macroeconomics of Unbalanced Growth: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(1), pages 150, March.
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  22. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-27, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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