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Representative vs. Direct Democracy and Government Spending in a Median Voter Model

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  • Chicoine, David L
  • Walzer, N
  • Deller, S C

Abstract

Combining economics and the political process, demand-oriented median voter models provide a framework for analyzing local government budgetary behavior. Using observations from Illinois townships (operating under representative democracy) and Minnesota townships (operating under direct democracy), the institutional structure of collective decision-making in the provision of essential rural road services is studied. Institutional structure was found to be important in analyzing local government behavior with a median voter model. The difficulty of reducing a complex tax system into a representative tax-price variable proved to be a limiting factor in obtaining more conclusive results.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by in its journal Public Finance = Finances publiques.

Volume (Year): 44 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 225-36

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Handle: RePEc:pfi:pubfin:v:44:y:1989:i:2:p:225-36

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Cited by:
  1. Feld, Lars P. & Kirchgassner, Gebhard, 2000. "Direct democracy, political culture, and the outcome of economic policy: a report on the Swiss experience," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 287-306, June.
  2. Gebhard Kirchgässner, 2001. "The Effects of Fiscal Institutions on Public Finance: A Survey of the Empirical Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 617, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. John Bradbury & W. Crain, 2005. "Legislative district configurations and fiscal policy in American States," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 385-407, December.

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