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Theories of Tax Competition

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  • Wilson, John Douglas
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    Abstract

    A central message of the tax competition literature is that independent governments engage in wasteful competition for scarce capital through reductions in tax rates and public expenditure levels. This paper discusses many of the contributions to this literature, ranging from early demonstrations of wasteful tax competition to more recent contributions that identify efficiency-enhancing roles for competition among governments. Such roles involve considerations not present in earlier models, including imperfectly-competitive market structures, government commitment problems, and political economy considerations.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by National Tax Association in its journal National Tax Journal.

    Volume (Year): 52 (1999)
    Issue (Month): n. 2 (June)
    Pages: 269-304

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    Handle: RePEc:ntj:journl:v:52:y:1999:i:n._2:p:269-304

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    1. Amrita Dhillon & Carlo Perroni & Kim Scharf, 1997. "Implementing tax co-ordination," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies W97/12, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    2. Gordon, R.H. & Bovenberg, A.L., 1994. "Why is capital so immobile internationally?: Possible explanations and implications for capital income taxation," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1994-63, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Michael Keen, 1997. "Vertical Tax Externalities in the Theory of Fiscal Federalism," IMF Working Papers, International Monetary Fund 97/173, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Gordon, Roger H, 1986. "Taxation of Investment and Savings in a World Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(5), pages 1086-1102, December.
    5. Lee, Kangoh, 1997. "Tax Competition with Imperfectly Mobile Capital," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 222-242, September.
    6. Bucovetsky, S., 1995. "Rent seeking and tax competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 337-363, November.
    7. Hoyt, William H. & Jensen, Richard A., 1996. "Precommitment in a system of hierarchical governments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(5), pages 481-504, August.
    8. Bucovetsky, Sam & Wilson, John Douglas, 1991. "Tax competition with two tax instruments," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 333-350, November.
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