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The Political Economy of Environmental Policy

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Author Info
Portney, Paul
Oates, Wallace () (Resources for the Future)

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Abstract

This paper provides a review and assessment of the extensive literature on the political determination of environmental regulation. A promising theoretical literature has emerged relatively recently that provides models of the political interaction of government with various interest groups in the setting of environmental standards and the choice of regulatory instruments. A large empirical literature supports such models, finding evidence of the influence of interest groups but also evidence that net social benefits are often an important determinant of environmental policy choices. We then take up the issue of environmental federalism and the large and growing theoretical literature that addresses the competitive “race to the bottom.” The paper concludes with a brief look at the evolution of environmental policy and finds that economics has come to play a growing role both in the setting of standards for environmental quality and in the design of regulatory measures.

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Paper provided by Resources For the Future in its series Discussion Papers with number dp-01-55.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 2001
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Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-01-55

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Related research
Keywords: environmental regulation; environmental management; environmental policy;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ted Bergstrom, 1979. "When Does Majority Rule Supply Public Goods Efficiently?," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1979A, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Goodman, Robert P, 1973. "Private Demands for Public Goods," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(3), pages 280-96, June.
    Other versions:
  5. Borcherding, Thomas E & Deacon, Robert T, 1972. "The Demand for the Services of Non-Federal Governments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 891-901, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Becker, Gary S, 1983. "A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521023894 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Drosdowski, Thomas, 2006. "On the Link Between Democracy and Environment," Diskussionspapiere der Wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Fakultät der Universität Hannover dp-355, Universität Hannover, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät. [Downloadable!]
  2. Anger, Niels & Böhringer, Christoph & Lange, Andreas, 2006. "Differentiation of Green Taxes: A Political-Economy Analysis for Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-03, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cristina Ciocirlan & Bruce Yandle, 2003. "The Political Economy of Green Taxation in OECD Countries," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 203-218, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Anesi, Vincent & De Donder, Philippe, 2008. "Secondary Issues and Party Politics: An Application to Environmental Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 6774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Introduction to the Political Economy of Environmental Regulation," Working Paper Series rwp04-004, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Anger, Niels & Böhringer, Christoph & Oberndorfer, Ulrich, 2008. "Public Interest vs. Interest Groups: Allowance Allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme," ZEW Discussion Papers 08-023, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  7. Per G. Fredriksson & Xenia Matschke & Jenny Minier, 2008. "Environmental Policy in Majoritarian Systems," Working papers 2008-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2009. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hua Wang & Wenhua Di, 2002. "The determinants of Government environmental performance - an empirical analysis of Chinese townships," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2937, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Tetsuo Ono, 2009. "The political economy of environmental and social security policies: the role of environmental lobbying," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 261-296, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hein Roelfsema, 2004. "Strategic Delegation of Environmental Policy Making," Working Papers 04-11, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Joan Canton, 2007. "Redealing the Cards: How the Presence of an Eco-Industry Modifies the Political Economy of Environmental Policies," Working Papers 2007.25, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  12. María A. García-Valiñas, 2004. "Environmental federalism: a proposal of decentralization," ERSA conference papers ersa04p492, European Regional Science Association. [Downloadable!]
  13. John A. List & Daniel M. Sturm, 2004. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy," NBER Working Papers 10609, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Hattori, Keisuke, 2007. "Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies," MPRA Paper 6333, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Per Fredriksson & Herman Vollebergh, 2009. "Corruption, federalism, and policy formation in the OECD: the case of energy policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 205-221, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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