Factor Ownership and Governmental Strategic Interaction
AbstractA fiscal policy of a jurisdiction alters the allocation of mobile factors among jurisdictions, affecting other jurisdictions and creating an externality. Since each jurisdiction does not take into account the externality, the equilibrium fiscal policy on mobile factors is inefficient. However, individuals of a jurisdiction may own immobile factors located in other jurisdictions. The government for the jurisdiction then considers the effects of its policy on the returns to the immobile factor located in other jurisdictions. The cross-ownership of immobile factors thus affects the efficiency of fiscal policies. The present paper considers capital tax competition as an example to illustrate the effects of the ownership structure of immobile factors on the equilibrium fiscal policy, and extends the analysis to other types of fiscal competition. Copyright 2003 Blackwell Publishing Inc..
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Association for Public Economic Theory in its journal Journal of Public Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 5 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (04)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1097-3923
More information through EDIRC
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Braid, Ralph M., 2005. "Tax competition, tax exporting and higher-government choice of tax instruments for local governments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1789-1821, September.
- Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Wagner, W.B., 2008.
"Efficiency of capital taxation in an open economy: Tax competition versus tax exportation,"
Open Access publications from Tilburg University
urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3125166, Tilburg University.
- Wolf Wagner & Sylvester Eijffinger, 2008. "Efficiency of capital taxation in an open economy: tax competition versus tax exportation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(6), pages 637-646, December.
- Braid, Ralph M., 2013. "State and local tax competition in a spatial model with sales taxes and residential property taxes," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 57-67.
- Burbidge, John & Cuff, Katherine & Leach, John, 2006.
"Tax competition with heterogeneous firms,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 533-549, February.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.