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The voluntary provision of a pure public good: The case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol

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Murdoch, James C.
Sandler, Todd
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 63 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (February)
Pages: 331-349
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:63:y:1997:i:3:p:331-349

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  1. Marini, Marco A. & Currarini, Sergio, 2003. "A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities," MPRA Paper 1689, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
  2. Hilary Sigman, 2002. "International Spillovers and Water Quality in Rivers: Do Countries Free Ride?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1152-1159, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Lange, Andreas & Vogt, Carsten, 2001. "Cooperation in international environmental negotiations due to a preference for equity," ZEW Discussion Papers 01-14, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Todd Sandler, 1998. "Global and regional public goods: a prognosis for collective action," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 221-247, August. [Downloadable!]
  5. Hein Roelfsema, 2004. "Strategic Delegation of Environmental Policy Making," Working Papers 04-11, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Scott Barret, 1998. "On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 317-333, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Lange, Andreas, 2004. "The Impact of Equity-preferences on the Stability of Heterogeneous International Agreements," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-50, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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