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A Rawlsian Approach to International Cooperation

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  • Wolfgang Buchholz
  • Wolfgang Peters

Abstract

Sowohl in der Ökonomischen Theorie des Föderalismus als auch in der Internationalen Umweltöko-nomik wird nach Bedingungen gesucht, unter denen Länder oder Ländergruppen bereit sind, in eine Kooperationsbeziehung mit anderen Ländern einzutreten. Der vorliegende Aufsatz entwickelt zu-nächst - im Rahmen des Standardmodells aus der Theorie öffentlicher Güter - ein allgemeines Kri-terium für freiwillige individuell rationale Kooperation mit dem Ziel der Bereitstellung eines inter-nationalen öffentlichen Gutes. Dieses Kriterium beruht auf dem Reziprozitäts-Gedanken und greift auf Fairness-Konzepte von Wicksell und Rawls zurück. Mit seiner Hilfe lassen sich einzelne Bestim-mungsfaktoren identifizieren, von denen es abhängt, ob sich für eine Ländergruppe der Beitritt zu einer internationalen Umweltkoalition lohnt. Dabei kommt sowohl dem Anpassungsverhalten der ur-sprünglichen Koalitions-Mitglieder als auch dem der nicht-kooperativen Auβenseiter entscheidende Bedeutung zu. Die theoretischen Überlegungen werden schlieβlich dazu verwendet, das aktuelle Ver-halten von Ländern und Ländergruppen (insbesondere der EU, der USA und der Entwicklungsländer) im Rahmen des Kyoto-Prozesses zu interpretieren und eine Einschätzung möglicher Zukunftspers-pektiven der globalen Klimaschutzpolitik zu geben. Copyright 2005 Blackwell Publishing Ltd..

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Wiley Blackwell in its journal Kyklos.

Volume (Year): 58 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
Pages: 25-44

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Handle: RePEc:bla:kyklos:v:58:y:2005:i:1:p:25-44

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Cited by:
  1. Frederik Carlsson & Mitesh Kataria & Alan Krupnick & Elina Lampi & Åsa Löfgren & Ping Qin & Thomas Sterner & S. Chung, 2010. "A Fair Share - Burden-Sharing Preferences in the United States and China," Jena Economic Research Papers 2010-074, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  2. Alfred Endres, 2008. "Ein Unmöglichkeitstheorem für die Klimapolitik?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(3), pages 350-382, 08.
  3. Wolfgang Buchholz & Cornelia Ohl & Aneta Ufert, 2012. "Ökonomische Blickwinkel auf Gerechtigkeitsfragen am Beispiel des globalen Klimaschutzes," Discussion Paper Series RECAP15 001, RECAP15, European University Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder).
  4. Kesternich, Martin & Löschel, Andreas & Ziegler, Andreas, 2014. "Negotiating weights for burden sharing rules among heterogeneous parties: Empirical evidence from a survey among delegates in international climate negotiations," ZEW Discussion Papers 14-031, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  5. Wolfgang Buchholz & Johannes Pfeiffer, 2011. "Energiepolitische Implikationen einer Energiewende," Ifo Schnelldienst, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 64(18), pages 30-39, October.

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