An Equitable, Efficient and Implementable Scheme to Control Global Carbon Dioxide Emissions
AbstractWe design an international scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions in which autonomous developed and developing regions choose their own carbon dioxide emissions in anticipation of interregional resource transfers to be implemented by an international agency. This agency’s objective function obeys a proportional equity principle, which preserves the status-quo relative ranking of regional welfare levels. We show that it is individually rational for each region to participate in our proposed international scheme and that regional environmental authorities choose policies that internalize the global environmental externalities. These results are especially noteworthy in light of the call for international transfers from developed to developing countries in the Kyoto Protocol.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Utah State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2002-22.
Length: 18 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2002
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Arthur Caplan & Emilson Silva, 2007. "An equitable, efficient and implementable scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 263-279, June.
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
- Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy
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