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Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Michael Finus ()
Ekko Ierland
Rob Dellink
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance .
Volume (Year): 7 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 271-291
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Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:271-291Contact details of provider: Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/10101/index.htm
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Keywords: International environmental agreements Kyoto-Protocol Cartel formation Stability of coalitions Non-cooperative game theory C72 H41 Q25 Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Buchner, Barbara & Carraro, Carlo & Cersosimo, Igor & Marchiori, Carmen, 2002.
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Germain, M. & Toint, P. & Tulkens, H. & de Zeeuw A., 1998.
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"Transfers to sustain dynamic core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control ,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control ,
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Kaitala, Veijo & Maler, Karl-Goran & Tulkens, Henry, 1995.
" The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International Cooperation among Finland, Russia and Estonia ,"
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Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003.
"New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming ,"
Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series
ete0318, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
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Other versions: Maryse Labriet & Richard Loulou, 2008.
"How Crucial is Cooperation in Mitigating World Climate? Analysis with World-MARKAL ,"
Computational Management Science ,
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Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008.
"Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND ,"
Working Papers
FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008.
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Hans-Peter Weikard & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, 2004.
"The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements ,"
Working Papers
2004.99, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
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Other versions: Gersbach, Hans & Winkler, Ralph, 2007.
"On the Design of Global Refunding and Climate Change ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6379, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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