Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation
AbstractWe analyze the formation of self-enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto-improving to all parties.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2005.45.
Date of creation: Mar 2005
Date of revision:
International environmental agreements; Timing of participation decision; Coalition theory; Role of international regulator;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2005-04-24 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2005-04-24 (Regulation)
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