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Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage Between R&D and Climate Cooperation

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Author Info
Buchner, Barbara
Carraro, Carlo
Cersosimo, Igor
Marchiori, Carmen

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Abstract

The US decision not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and the recent outcomes of the Bonn and Marrakech Conferences of the Parties drastically reduces the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. The reason is not only the reduced emission abatement in the US, but also the spillover effects on technology and countries’ relative bargaining power induced by the US decision. Therefore, it is crucial to analyse whether an incentive strategy exists that could induce the US to revise their decision and to comply with the Kyoto commitments. One solution, occasionally proposed in the literature and in actual policymaking, is to link negotiations on climate change control with decisions concerning international R&D cooperation. This Paper explores this idea by analysing on the one hand the incentives for EU, Japan and Russia to adopt this strategy, and on the other hand the incentives for the US to join a coalition which cooperates both on climate change control and on technological innovation. The extended regime in which cooperation takes place on both dimensions (GHG emissions and R&D) will be examined from the view-point of countries’ profitability and free-riding incentives. Finally, after having assessed the effectiveness and credibility of the issue linkage strategy, we explore the economic and environmental benefits of a new, recently proposed regime, which aims at achieving GHG emission control by enhancing cooperation on technological innovation and diffusion (without targets on emissions).

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3299.

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Date of creation: Apr 2002
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3299

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Related research
Keywords: agreements; climate; incentives; negotiations; policy; technological change;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
H00 - Public Economics - - General - - - General
H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General
O30 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - General

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2007. "International Energy R&D Spillovers and the Economics of Greenhouse Gas Atmospheric Stabilization," Working Papers 2007.82, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol," Working Papers 2006_12Classification-JEL, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0318, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Michael Finus & Ekko van Ierland, 2003. "Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game," Working Papers 2003.61, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Regional and sub-global climate blocs. A game-theoretic perspective on bottom-up climate regimes," Working Papers 2006_10, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Laurent Drouet & Alain Haurie & Francesco Moresino & Jean-Philippe Vial & Marc Vielle & Laurent Viguier, 2008. "An oracle based method to compute a coupled equilibrium in a model of international climate policy," Computational Management Science, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 119-140, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model," Working Papers 2009.64, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  8. Richard S.J. Tol, 2002. "Technology Protocols For Climate Change: An Application Of Fund," Working Papers FNU-14, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Sep 2002. [Downloadable!]
  9. Geoffrey Heal & Nori Tarui, 2008. "Technology diffusion, abatement cost, and transboundary pollution," Working Papers 200803, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2003. "China and the Evolution of the Present Climate Regime," Working Papers 2003.103, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  11. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "US, China and the economics of climate negotiations," Working Papers 2006_07, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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