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Constraining equitable allocations of tradable greenhouse gases emission quotas by acceptability

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  • GERMAIN, Marc
  • VAN STEENBERGHE, Vincent

Abstract

Allocations of tradable greenhouse gases (GHG) emission quotas among countries may take place according to several sharing rules corresponding to a certain perception of equity. For instance, allocating quotas in direct proportion to population, in inverse relation to GDP or according to past emissions has been advocated. Taking a long term perspective, we compute such allocations of tradable quotas with a dynamic model developped on the basis of the RICE model (Norhaus and Yang, 1996). The total amount of quotas to be distributed in each period corresponds to the total optimal amount of emissions to be realised at each period. We observe that the "equitable" quotas allocation rules the most often referred to are not acceptable by every country at every period: some of them would be better off by not co-operating. We then propose a mechanism which determines allocations of GHG emission quotas that satisfy as much as possible each "equitable" allocation rule while keeping acceptability for each country.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2001005.

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Date of creation: 00 Jan 2001
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2001005

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Related research

Keywords: environmental economics; climate change; dynamic games; tradable permits; equitable allocations;

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References

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  1. Larsen, Bjorn & Shah, Anwar, 1994. "Global tradable carbon permits, participation incentives, and transfers," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1315, The World Bank.
  2. GERMAIN, Marc & VAN YPERSELE, Jean-Pascal, 1999. "Financial transfers to sustain international cooperation in the climate change framework," CORE Discussion Papers 1999036, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1158, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. repec:fth:louvco:9936 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Eyckmans, Johan & Tulkens, Henry, 2003. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 299-327, October.
  6. Rose, Adam & Stevens, Brandt, 1993. "The efficiency and equity of marketable permits for CO2 emissions," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 117-146, March.
  7. Peter Bohm & Bjorn Larsen, 1994. "Fairness in a tradeable-permit treaty for carbon emissions reductions in Europe and the former Soviet Union," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(3), pages 219-239, June.
  8. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  9. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  10. GERMAIN, Marc & TOINT, Philippe & TULKENS, Henry & DE ZEEUW, Aart, 1998. "Transfers to sustain core-theoretic cooperation in international stock pollutant control," CORE Discussion Papers 1998032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  11. Johan Eyckmans & Henry Tulkens, 1999. "Simulating with RICE Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 228, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. repec:fth:louvco:9926 is not listed on IDEAS
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Miyuki Nagashima & Rob Dellink, 2007. "Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions," Working Papers 2007.98, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, 2006. "Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 19-48, May.
  3. Pedro, de Mendonça, 2009. "Self-Enforcing Climate Change Treaties: A Generalized Differential Game Approach with Applications," MPRA Paper 17889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Ekko Ierland, 2005. "The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 95-127, July.
  5. Frank Jotzo & John C. V. Pezzey, 2005. "Optimal intensity targets for emissions trading under uncertainty (now replaced by EEN0605)," Economics and Environment Network Working Papers 0504, Australian National University, Economics and Environment Network.
  6. Michael Finus & Ekko van Ierland, 2003. "Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game," Working Papers 2003.61, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  7. VAN STEENBERGHE, Vincent, 2004. "Core-stable and equitable allocations of greenhouse gas emission permits," CORE Discussion Papers 2004075, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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