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Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements

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Author Info
Carlo Carraro () (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca’ Foscari)
Johan Eyckmans (European University College Brussels EHSAL and Center for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.)
Michael Finus (Department of Economics, University of Hagen and National University of Singapore)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The literature on international environmental agreements has recognized the role transfers play in encouraging participation in international environmental agreements. However, the results achieved so far are overly specific. Therefore, we develop a more general framework that enables us to study the role of transfers in a systematic way. We propose transfers using both internal and external financial resources for making “welfare optimal agreements” self-enforcing. To illustrate the relevance of our transfer scheme, we use a stylized integrated assessment simulation model of climate change to show how appropriate transfers may induce almost all countries into signing a self-enforcing climate treaty.

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File URL: http://www.dse.unive.it/fileadmin/templates/dse/wp/WP/WP_DSE_Carraro_Eyckmans_Finus_44_06.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2006_44.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_44

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Postal: Cannaregio, S. Giobbe no 873 , 30121 Venezia
Phone: 2574183
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Web page: http://www.dse.unive.it
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Related research
Keywords: Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements Climate Policy Transfers

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0317, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
  2. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004. "An Empirical Assessment of Measures to Enhance the Success of Global Climate Treaties," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0406, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
  3. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Martin L. Weitzman, 2001. "Gamma Discounting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 260-271, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Petrakis, Emmanuel & Xepapadeas, Anastasios, 1996. "Environmental consciousness and moral hazard in international agreements to protect the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 95-110, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Nordhaus, William D & Yang, Zili, 1996. "A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 741-65, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Buchholz, Wolfgang & Konrad, Kai A., 1995. "Strategic transfers and private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 489-505, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Working Papers 897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  9. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
    Other versions:
  10. Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, 1997. "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(2), pages 153-170, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Barrett, Scott, 2001. "International cooperation for sale," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(10), pages 1835-1850, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Kaitala, Veijo & Maler, Karl-Goran & Tulkens, Henry, 1995. " The Acid Rain Game as a Resource Allocation Process with an Application to the International Cooperation among Finland, Russia and Estonia," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 97(2), pages 325-43, June.
  15. Eyckmans, Johan & Tulkens, Henry, 2003. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 299-327, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Bosello, Francesco & Buchner, Barbara & Carraro, Carlo & Raggi, Davide, 2003. "Can Equity Enhance Efficiency? Some Lessons from Climate Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3606, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2004. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0414, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Thierry, BRECHET & François, GERARD & Henry, TULKENS, 2007. "Climate coalitions : a theoretical and computational appraisal," Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques Working Paper 2007006, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two," Working Papers FNU-149, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
  3. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2008. "Evolution in time of Farsightedly Stable Coalitions: An Application of FUND," Working Papers FNU-162, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised May 2008. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kohnz, Simone, 2006. "Ratification quotas in international agreements," Discussion Papers in Economics 900, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. Gersbach, Hans & Winkler, Ralph, 2007. "On the Design of Global Refunding and Climate Change," CEPR Discussion Papers 6379, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Parallel Climate Blocs. Incentives to cooperation in international climate negotiations," Working Papers 2006_45, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Carlo Carraro, 2006. "Incentives and Institutions. A Bottom-up Approach to Climate Policy," Working Papers 2006_49, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Thierry Bréchet & François Gerard, 2007. "Climate Coalitions: A Theoretical and Computational Appraisal," Working Papers 2007.21, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  9. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions," Working Papers FNU-150, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
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