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Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements

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Author Info
Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera (Wageningen University)
Michael Finus (University of Hagen)

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Abstract

We analyze the implication of different allocation schemes of CO2-emission permits for stability and the success of international climate agreements. Our model combines a game theoretical with an empirical module that comprises 12 world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We consider seven different permit allocation schemes. Two “pragmatic schemes” allocate permits according to a uniform emission reductio quota, five “equitable schemes” allocate permits based on some normative criteria frequently discussed in the literature permit trading can raise participation and the success of climate agreements, but pragmatic schemes are superior to equitable ones.

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File URL: http://www4.cema.edu.ar/pjae/m/129AltamirFinus200605
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Universidad del CEMA in its journal Journal of Applied Economics.

Volume (Year): IX (2006)
Issue (Month): (May)
Pages: 19-48
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Handle: RePEc:cem:jaecon:v:9:y:2006:n:1:p:19-48

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Related research
Keywords: climate agreements; tradable emission permits; coalition formation; self-enforcing agreements;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Ekko Ierland, 2005. "The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 125(1), pages 95-127, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2003. "Coalition Formation in a Global Warming Game: How the Design of Protocols Affects the Success of Environmental Treaty-Making," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0317, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Santiago Rubio & Alistair Ulph, 2003. "An Infinite-Horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2003.57, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Kverndokk, S., 1992. "Tradeable CO2 Emission Permits: Initial Distribution as a Justice Problem," Memorandum 23/1992, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  5. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Martin L. Weitzman, 2001. "Gamma Discounting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(1), pages 260-271, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Toman, Michael & Shogren, Jason, 2000. "Climate Change Policy," Discussion Papers dp-00-22, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hans-Peter Weikard & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Michael Finus, 2004. "The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements," Working Papers 2004.99, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Eyckmans, Johan & Tulkens, Henry, 2003. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 299-327, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Francesco Bosello & Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro, 2003. "Equity, Development, and Climate Change Control," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 601-611, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Carraro, Carlo & Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael, 2005. "Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 5046, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Hans-Peter Weikard & Rob Dellink, 2008. "Sticks and Carrots for the Design of International Climate Agreements with Renegotiations," Working Papers 2008.26, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  3. Valentina Bosetti & Carlo Carraro & Enrica De Cian & Romain Duval & Emanuele Massetti & Massimo Tavoni, 2009. "The Incentives to Participate in, and the Stability of, International Climate Coalitions: A Game-theoretic Analysis Using the Witch Model," Working Papers 2009.64, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  4. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2009. "Membership rules and stability of coalition structures in positive externality games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 389-406, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. M Sáiz & Eligius Hendrix & Niels Olieman, 2006. "On the Computation of Stability in Multiple Coalition Formation Games," Computational Economics, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 251-275, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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