The Impact of Surplus Sharing on The Stability of International Climate Agreements
AbstractThis paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement for different sharing rules applied to the gains from co-operation. We use a 12-regions model designed to examine internal and external stability of coalitions (STACO). We compare different sharing rules like, for example, grandfathering (i.e. sharing proportional to emissions) and a number of so-called equitable rules like, for example, sharing proportional to population or according to historical responsibilities. Due to strong free-rider incentives we find only small stable coalitions for all sharing rules examined. As a general pattern we observe that coalitions consist of regions with low marginal abatement costs, which are attractive partners in any coalition, and regions which have the highest claims according to the respective sharing rule. Furthermore, we find that a grandfathering scheme leads to the largest and – in terms of greenhouse gas abatement – most successful coalition, while many of the equitable rules achieve very little.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2004.99.
Date of creation: Jun 2004
Date of revision:
International environmental agreements; Sharing rules; Stability of coalitions;
Other versions of this item:
- Hans-Peter Weikard & Michael Finus & Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, 2006. "The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 209-232, April.
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water
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