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An infinite-horizon model of dynamic membership of international environmental agreements

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  • Rubio, Santiago J.
  • Ulph, Alistair

Abstract

Much of the literature on international environmental agreements uses static models, although most important transboundary pollution problems involve stock pollutants. The few papers that study IEAs using models of stock pollutants do not allow for the possibility that membership of the IEA may change endogenously over time. In this paper we analyse a simple infinite-horizon version of the Barrett (1994) model, in which unit damage costs increase with the stock of pollution, and countries decide each period whether to join an IEA. We show that there exists a steady-state stock of pollution with corresponding steady-state IEA membership, and that if the initial stock of pollution is below (above) steady-state then membership of the IEA declines (rises) as the stock of pollution tends to steady-state. As we increase the parameter linking damage costs to the pollution stock, initial and steady-state membership decline; in the limit, membership is small and constant over time. Keywords; self-enforcing international environmental agreements, internal and external stability, stock pollutant

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 54 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 296-310

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:54:y:2007:i:3:p:296-310

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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  1. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Working Papers 897, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
  3. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
  4. Rubio, S. & Ulph, A., 2002. "A simple dynamic model of international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0209, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  5. Santiago J. Rubio, 2001. "International Cooperation In Pollution Control," Working Papers. Serie AD 2001-21, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
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