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New Roads to International Environmental Agreements: The Case of Global Warming

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Author Info

  • Michael Finus

    (Department of Economics, University of Hagen, Germany)

  • Johan Eyckmans

    (K.U. Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Leuven, Belgium)

Abstract

We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open membership rule. It turns out that regional agreements are superior to a single agreement and exclusive is superior to open membership in welfare and ecological terms. Moreover, we show the importance of transfers for successful treaty-making. We relate our results to the design of current and past IEAs as well as to other issues of international policy coordination.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2003.88.

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Date of creation: Sep 2003
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.88

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Related research

Keywords: Design of climate treaty protocol; Coalition formation; Non-cooperative game theory;

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References

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  1. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 1995. "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 279-293, August.
  2. Johan Eyckmans, 2001. "On the farsighted stability of the Kyoto Protocol," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0103, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Energy, Transport and Environment.
  3. Eyckmans, Johan & Tulkens, Henry, 2003. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 299-327, October.
  4. Finus, Michael & Rundshagen, Bianca, 1998. " Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 145-86, July.
  5. Michael Finus & Ekko Ierland & Rob Dellink, 2006. "Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 271-291, August.
  6. Michael Hoel, 1992. "International environment conventions: The case of uniform reductions of emissions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 141-159, March.
  7. CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry & VAN YPERSELE, Jean-Pascal & WILLEMS, Stephane, . "The Kyoto Protocol: an economic and game-theoretic interpretation," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1590, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2003. "How the Rules of Coalition Formation Affect Stability of International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2003.62, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  9. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  10. Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro, 2003. "Emissions Trading Regimes and Incentives to Participate in International Climate Agreements," Working Papers 2003.104, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  11. Nordhaus, William D., 1993. "Rolling the 'DICE': an optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 27-50, March.
  12. Johan Eyckmans, 1999. "Strategy Proof Uniform Effort Sharing Schemes For Transfrontier Pollution Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 14(2), pages 165-189, September.
  13. Johan Eyckmans & Henry Tulkens, 1999. "Simulating with RICE Coalitionally Stable Burden Sharing Agreements for the Climate Change Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 228, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Adam Rose & Brandt Stevens & Jae Edmonds & Marshall Wise, 1998. "International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(1), pages 25-51, July.
  15. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1991. "Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment," CEPR Discussion Papers 568, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Bosello, Francesco & Buchner, Barbara & Carraro, Carlo & Raggi, Davide, 2003. "Can Equity Enhance Efficiency? Some Lessons from Climate Negotiations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3606, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  17. Buchner, Barbara & Carraro, Carlo & Cersosimo, Igor & Marchiori, Carmen, 2002. "Back to Kyoto? US Participation and the Linkage Between R&D and Climate Cooperation," CEPR Discussion Papers 3299, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Rubio, S. & Ulph, A., 2002. "A simple dynamic model of international environmental agreements with a stock pollutant," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0209, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  19. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2003. "A Non-cooperative Foundation of Core-Stability in Positive Externality NTU-Coalition Games," Working Papers 2003.31, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  20. Carraro, Carlo & Marchiori, Carmen, 2002. "Stable Coalitions," CEPR Discussion Papers 3258, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  21. repec:fth:louvco:9926 is not listed on IDEAS
  22. Kverndokk, S., 1992. "Tradeable CO2 Emission Permits: Initial Distribution as a Justice Problem," Memorandum 23/1992, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  23. Guttman, Joel M., 1998. "Unanimity and majority rule: the calculus of consent reconsidered," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 189-207, May.
  24. Yukihiko Funaki & Takehiko Yamato, 1999. "The core of an economy with a common pool resource: A partition function form approach," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 157-171.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Alfred Endres, 2008. "Ein Unmöglichkeitstheorem für die Klimapolitik?," Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 9(3), pages 350-382, 08.
  2. Mélanie HEUGUES, 2009. "Une nouvelle mise en perspective des problèmes environnementaux globaux dans le cas du changement climatique : les impacts de la complémentarité stratégique entre pays," Working Papers 249312, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
  3. Porchiung Chou & Cheickna Sylla, 2008. "The formation of an international environmental agreement as a two-stage exclusive cartel formation game with transferable utilities," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(4), pages 317-341, December.
  4. M Sáiz & Eligius Hendrix & Niels Olieman, 2006. "On the Computation of Stability in Multiple Coalition Formation Games," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(3), pages 251-275, October.
  5. Alberto Ansuategi & Marta Escapa, 2004. "Is international cooperation on climate change good for the environment?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 17(7), pages 1-11.

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