This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Effrosyni Diamantoudi (University of Aarhus)
Eftichios Sartzetakis (University of Macedonia)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper we examine the formation of International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We provide an analytical treatment of the main model used in the literature and offer a formal solution of it (which has not been available so far), while we clarify some misconceptions that exist in the literature. We find that the unique stable IEA consist of either two, three or four signatories if the number of countries is greater than or equal to 5. Furthermore, we show that the welfare of the signatories of a stable IEA is very close to its lowest level vs the welfare of signatories of other non-stable IEAs. While in our model countries' choice variable is emissions, we extend our results to the case where the choice variable is abatement efforts.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/othr/papers/0201/0201001.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Others with number 0201001.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 14 Jan 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpot:0201001

Note: Type of Document - pdf;
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://129.3.20.41

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (EconWPA).

Related research
Keywords: International Environmental Agreements; Coalition Formation;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ioannidis, Alexis & Papandreou, Andreas & Sartzetakis, Eftichios, 2000. "International Environmental Agreements: a Literature Review," Cahiers de recherche 0008, GREEN. [Downloadable!]
  2. Claude, et al d'Aspremont, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. S. De Cara & Gilles Rotillon, 2003. "Multigreenhouse gas international agreements," THEMA Working Papers 2003-13, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
  4. Ray, Debraj & Vohra, Rajiv, 1999. "A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 286-336, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
    Other versions:
  7. Michael Hoel & Kerstin Schneider, 1997. "Incentives to participate in an international environmental agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 9(2), pages 153-170, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Bloch, Francis, 1996. "Sequential Formation of Coalitions in Games with Externalities and Fixed Payoff Division," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 90-123, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Kohnz, Simone, 2006. "Ratification quotas in international agreements," Discussion Papers in Economics 900, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mélanie Heugues, 2009. "International Environmental Cooperation: A New Eye on the Greenhouse Gases Emissions’ Control," Working Papers 09-04, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Mar 2009. [Downloadable!]
  3. Carlo Carraro & Carmen Marchiori & Sonia Oreffice, 2009. "Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Treaties," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 42(3), pages 411-425, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Michael Finus & Dirk T.G. Rübbelke, 2008. "Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy," Working Papers 2008.62, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Pierre Courtois & Guillaume Haeringer, 2005. "The Making of International Environmental Agreements," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 652.05, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  6. Alistair Ulph & Santiago J. Rubio, 2004. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements Revisited," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-23, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions," Working Papers FNU-150, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two," Working Papers FNU-149, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
  9. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2005. "Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation," Working Papers 2005.45, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  10. Marta Biancardi & Giovanni Villani, 2009. "International Environmental Agreements with Asymmetric Countries," Quaderni DSEMS 09-2009, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia. [Downloadable!]
  11. Marta Biancardi & Andrea Di Liddo, 2008. "International Environmental Agreement: a Dynamic Model of Emissions Reduction," Quaderni DSEMS 13-2008, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia. [Downloadable!]
  12. Benchekroun, H. & Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2008. "Collusion Inducing Taxation of a Polluting Oligopoly," Discussion Paper 2008-80, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS uses the data collected within the RePEc project, the largest online bibliographic database in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.