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An ideal Kyoto protocol: emissions trading, redistributive transfers and global participation


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  • Arthur J. Caplan
  • Richard C. Cornes
  • Emilson C. D. Silva


We demonstrate that an interregional policy scheme featuring trading of carbon dioxide emissions, redistributive resource transfers and global participation, a scheme which we call 'Ideal Kyoto Protocol', yields an efficient equilibrium allocation for a global economy. An altruistic international agency--say, the Global Environment Facility--should operate the resource transfer mechanism. In addition, regional governments should be able to make independent policy commitments regarding how to control regional emissions of carbon dioxide in anticipation of the redistributive transfers. Our efficiency result suggests that the USA should be 'bribed' to reverse its decision of not participating in the Kyoto Protocol. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 55 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 216-234

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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:55:y:2003:i:2:p:216-234

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Cited by:
  1. Dirk T.G. R├╝bbelke & Vivekananda Mukherjee, 2006. "Global Climate Change, Technology Transfer and Trade with Complete Specialization," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2006.114, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  2. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2005. "A Rawlsian Approach to International Cooperation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 25-44, 02.
  3. Arthur Caplan & Emilson Silva, 2007. "An equitable, efficient and implementable scheme to control global carbon dioxide emissions," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 263-279, June.
  4. Gersbach, Hans & Winkler, Ralph, 2008. "International Emission Permit Markets with Refunding," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7035, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Robert Kohn, 2005. "A Theoretical Inefficiency in the International Marketing of Tradable Global Warming Emission Permits," Open Economies Review, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 23-31, January.
  6. Silva, Emilson C.D. & Zhu, Xie, 2008. "On the efficiency of a global market for carbon dioxide emission permits: Type of externality and timing of policymaking," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 213-216, August.
  7. Kristen A. Sheeran, 2006. "Side Payments of Exceptions: The Implications for Equitable and Efficient Climate Control," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(3), pages 515-532, Summer.
  8. Yukihiro Nishimura, 2008. "A Lindahl Solution to International Emissions Trading," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 1177, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  9. Silva, Emilson C.D. & Zhu, Xie, 2009. "Emissions trading of global and local pollutants, pollution havens and free riding," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 169-182, September.


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