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A Theoretical Inefficiency in the International Marketing of Tradable Global Warming Emission Permits

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Author Info
Robert Kohn ()
Abstract

When the disutility of global pollution is measured in units of a numeraire good that is polluting in consumption, the marginal rates of substitution in consumption are generally weighted differently in each country’s calculation of marginal damages. In that case, it is inefficient to control global warming by tradable emission permits, which in theory trade at a unique international equilibrium price. This conclusion is derived from a model of Shibata (1996) in which consumption is pervasively polluting in global warming gases. Shibata dubiously based the inefficiency he discovered on the reciprocal external damages of global warming emissions rather than on the nullibicity he posed for a non-polluting numeraire good. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11079-005-5330-3
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Open Economies Review.

Volume (Year): 16 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 23-31
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Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:16:y:2005:i:1:p:23-31

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Related research
Keywords: non-uniform Pigouvian taxes global pollutant global warming emission permits

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  1. Tietenberg, Thomas H, 1973. "Specific Taxes and the Control of Pollution: A General Equilibrium Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(4), pages 503-22, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Parry, Ian W. H. & Williams III, Roberton C., 1999. "A second-best evaluation of eight policy instruments to reduce carbon emissions," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3-4), pages 347-373, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Arthur J. Caplan & Richard C. Cornes & Emilson C. D. Silva, 2003. "An ideal Kyoto protocol: emissions trading, redistributive transfers and global participation," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 55(2), pages 216-234, April.
  4. Kohn, Robert E., 2001. "Unilateral transfer of abatement capital," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 85-95, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Pan, Haoran & Regemorter, Denise Van, 2004. "The costs and benefits of early action before Kyoto compliance," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(13), pages 1477-1486, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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