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Reasons for Conflict: Lessons from Bargaining Experiments

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Author Info
Armin Falk
Ernst Fehr
Urs Fischbacher

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Abstract

In this paper we experimentally study the effects of fairness, spite, and reputation formation on conflict. We show that fairness preferences are a potential source of conflict and that intentions play an important role in the perception of fairness. Further, we show that feelings of spite may affect the occurrence of conflict. Finally, we study reputation formation as a possible source of conflict. We show that people invest in a reputation of being a tough bargainer. This does not automatically increase conflict, however. The reason is that through reputation, information about one's opponent is much better than in anonymous bargaining.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 159 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 171-
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Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200303)159:1_171:rfclfb_2.0.tx_2-d

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

Cited by:
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  1. Sumon Kumar Bhaumik & Ira N. Gang & Myeong-Su Yun, 2007. "Rationality as a Barrier to Peace: Micro-Evidence from Kosovo," IZA Discussion Papers 2682, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.


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