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Nash Implementation of a Proportional Solution to International Pollution Control Problems

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  • Eyckmans, Johan

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 33 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 314-330

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:33:y:1997:i:3:p:314-330

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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References

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  1. Fraser, Clive D., 1992. "The uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods : An alternative proof," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 389-390, December.
  2. Foley, Duncan K, 1970. "Lindahl's Solution and the Core of an Economy with Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 38(1), pages 66-72, January.
  3. Kaneko, Mamoru, 1977. "The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 123-136, December.
  4. Varian, H,R., 1991. "A Solution to the Problem of Externalities when Agents are Well-Informed," Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory 10, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
  5. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  6. Hoel, Michael, 1991. "Global environmental problems: The effects of unilateral actions taken by one country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 55-70, January.
  7. Watts, Alison, 1996. "On the Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Cournot Oligopoly and Other Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 269-285, April.
  8. repec:fth:louvco:9550 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
  1. Urs Brandt, 2003. "Are Uniform Solutions Focal? – The Case of International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 25(3), pages 357-376, July.
  2. Yukihiro Nishimura, 2008. "A Lindahl Solution to International Emissions Trading," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 1177, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  3. EYCKMANS, Johan & TULKENS, Henry, 1999. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1999026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. John Duggan & Joanne Roberts, 2002. "Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1070-1078, September.
  5. Rodrigues, Joao & Domingos, Tiago & Giljum, Stefan & Schneider, Francois, 2006. "Designing an indicator of environmental responsibility," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 256-266, September.
  6. Candel-Sanchez, Francisco, 2006. "Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 56-59, January.
  7. Wolfgang Buchholz & Wolfgang Peters, 2005. "A Rawlsian Approach to International Cooperation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 25-44, 02.
  8. Candel-Sanchez, Francisco, 2006. "The externalities problem of transboundary and persistent pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 517-526, July.

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