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Thirteen Plus One: A Comparison of Global Climate Policy Architectures

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Author Info
Joseph E. Aldy (Department of Economics, Harvard University)
Scott Barrett (Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University)
Robert N. Stavins (John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University and Resources for the Future)

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Abstract

We critically review the Kyoto Protocol and thirteen alternative policy architectures for addressing the threat of global climate change. We employ six criteria to evaluate the policy proposals: environmental outcome, dynamic efficiency, cost effectiveness, equity, flexibility in the presence of new information, and incentives for participation and compliance. The Kyoto Protocol does not fare well on a number of criteria, but none of the alternative proposals fare well along all six dimensions. We identify several major themes among the alternative proposals: Kyoto is “too little, too fast”; developing countries should play a more substantial role and receive incentives to participate; implementation should focus on market-based approaches, especially those with price mechanisms; and participation and compliance incentives are inadequately addressed by most proposals. Our investigation reveals tensions among several of the evaluative criteria, such as between environmental outcome and efficiency, and between cost-effectiveness and incentives for participation and compliance.

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2003.64.

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Date of creation: Jul 2003
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2003.64

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Related research
Keywords: Policy architecture Kyoto Protocol Efficiency Cost effectiveness Equity Participation Compliance

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
Q3 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation
Q4 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy

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  1. Finn Roar Aune, Snorre Kverndokk, Lars Lindholt and Knut Einar Rosendahl, 2005. "Profitability of different instruments in international climate policies," Discussion Papers 403, Research Department of Statistics Norway. [Downloadable!]
  2. Stavins, Robert, 2004. "Can an Effective Global Climate Treaty Be Based on Sound Science, Rational Economics, and Pragmatic Politics?," Discussion Papers dp-04-28, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
  3. Katrin Rehdanz & Richard S.J. Tol, 2005. "A No Cap But Trade Proposal For Greenhous Gas Emission Reduction Targets For Brazil, China And India," Working Papers FNU-68, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Jul 2005. [Downloadable!]
  4. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Economic and Environmental Effectiveness of a Technology-based Climate Protocol," Working Papers 2006_12Classification-JEL, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Lawrence H. Goulder & William A. Pizer, 2006. "The Economics of Climate Change," NBER Working Papers 11923, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Jon Hovi og Bjart Holtsmark, 2005. "Cap-and-Trade or Carbon Taxes? The Feasibility of Enforcement and the Effects of Non-Compliance," Discussion Papers 436, Research Department of Statistics Norway. [Downloadable!]
  7. Sheila M. Olmstead & Robert N. Stavins, 2006. "An International Policy Architecture for the Post-Kyoto Era," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 35-38, May.
  8. James Bushnell & Carla Peterman & Catherine Wolfram, 2007. "Local Solutions to Global Problems: Policy Choice and Regulatory Jurisdiction," NBER Working Papers 13472, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Marco Grasso, 2004. "Climate change: the global public good," Others 0405010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Regional and sub-global climate blocs. A game-theoretic perspective on bottom-up climate regimes," Working Papers 2006_10, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Marschinski, Robert & Lecocq, Franck, 2006. "Do intensity targets control uncertainty better than quotas ? Conditions, calibrations, and caveats," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4033, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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