Voluntary Pooled Public Knowledge Goods and Coalition Formation
AbstractIn this paper we develop a theoretical model of the mechanisms behind the voluntary provision of public knowledge goods in coalitions in presence of social preferences. The model builds on the large empirical literature on voluntary production of pooled public knowledge goods, such as source code in communities of software developers or data voluntarily provided to open access data repositories. This literature shows that the provision of public goods is strongly dependent on the presence of social preferences such as group identity and social approval of individual pro-social attitudes. To integrate these effects in standard public good theory this paper builds a private-collective model of public good provision, where contribution to public knowledge goods generates both public and exclusive private benefits for the members of the coalition only. The analysis shows that, when the private benefit is important, the effect of the social preferences on the coalition formation is ambiguous. In particular, in the latter case, in presence of strong individual reputational effects, the public knowledge goods will be more difficult to produce. The comparison of the predictions of the theoretical model with the stylized facts of large scale surveys of Free/Libre/Open-Source (FLOSS) software developers confirms the results of the model.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) with number 2013020.
Date of creation: 03 Sep 2013
Date of revision:
coalition formation; private-collective model; social group identity; pro-social reputation; public knowledge goods; social dilemma;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-09-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2013-09-13 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-CDM-2013-09-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2013-09-13 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2013-09-13 (Network Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2013-09-13 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-09-13 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2013-09-13 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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