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The Political Economy of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey

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  • Leo Wangler

    ()
    (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)

  • JJuan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera

    ()
    (Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana-Azcapotzalco, Department of Economics, Growth and Environment Group, Mexico City, Mexico)

  • Hans-Peter Weikard

    ()
    (Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Wageningen University, The Netherlands.)

Abstract

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. Relevant are the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations.

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Paper provided by Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics in its series Jena Economic Research Papers with number 2011-038.

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Date of creation: 05 Sep 2011
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Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2011-038

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Keywords: international environmental agreements; coalition formation; coalition stability; environmental policy-making; strategic delegation; interest groups; free-rider incentives; determinants of international environmental cooperation; public goods experiments;

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Cited by:
  1. Hubert Kempf & Stéphane Rossignol, 2010. "National Politics and International Agreements," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00497463, HAL.

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