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Strategic delegation of environmental policy making

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  • Roelfsema, Hein

Abstract

A common claim is that nations should cooperate in environmental policy making. However, there is little empirical support that noncooperative decision making results in too low environmental standards and taxes. We develop a theoretical model and show that if the median voter cares sufficiently for the environment, she has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares more for the environment than she does herself. By doing so, she mitigates the`race to the bottom' in environmental taxes. In contrast, if environmental policies are determined cooperatively with other countries, the median voter has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares less for the environment than she does herself, so as to free ride on international environmental agreements.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 53 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 270-275

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:53:y:2007:i:2:p:270-275

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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References

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2013. "Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 219-234.
  2. Per G. Fredriksson & Xenia Matschke & Jenny Minier, 2008. "Environmental Policy in Majoritarian Systems," Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 2008-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2009.
  3. Perino, Grischa, 2010. "How delegation improves commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 137-139, February.
  4. Leo Wangler & JJuan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2011. "The Political Economy of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2011-038, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  5. Hattori, Keisuke, 2007. "Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies," MPRA Paper 6333, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Xiao Chen & Alan Woodland, 2013. "International trade and climate change," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 381-413, June.
  7. Jiancai Pi & Li Yang & Yu Zhou, 2013. "Privatization and environmental pollution in a mixed duopoly," Zbornik radova Ekonomskog fakulteta u Rijeci/Proceedings of Rijeka Faculty of Economics, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics, University of Rijeka, Faculty of Economics, vol. 31(2), pages 163-192.
  8. Kimiko Terai, 2008. "International Coordination and Domestic Politics," Working Papers, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics 080907, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  9. Amihai Glazer & Stef Proost, 2012. "Informational Benefits of International Treaties," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(2), pages 185-202, October.
  10. Martin Gregor & Lenka Šastná, 2011. "The Decentralization Tradeoff for Complementary Spillovers," Working Papers IES, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies 2011/13, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Apr 2011.
  11. Keisuke Hattori & Takahiro Kitamura, 2013. "Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 55(2), pages 199-215, June.
  12. Katarina Elofsson, 2011. "Delegation of Decision-Rights for Wetlands," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(2), pages 285-303, October.
  13. Robert Hahn & Robert Ritz, 2014. "Optimal Altruism in Public Good Provision," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 1403, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  14. B. Andrew Chupp, 2011. "Spillovers and Taxes: What Drives Strategic Competition in Environmental Policies?," Working Paper Series, Illinois State University, Department of Economics 20110402, Illinois State University, Department of Economics.
  15. R. Emre Aytimur & Aristotelis Boukouras & Robert Schwager, 2012. "The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 3900, CESifo Group Munich.
  16. Fredriksson, Per G. & Wang, Le & Mamun, Khawaja A., 2011. "Are politicians office or policy motivated? The case of U.S. governors' environmental policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 241-253, September.
  17. Kimiko Terai, 2012. "Financial Mechanism and Enforceability of International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(2), pages 297-308, October.

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