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Strategic delegation of environmental policy making

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  • Roelfsema, Hein

Abstract

A common claim is that nations should cooperate in environmental policy making. However, there is little empirical support that noncooperative decision making results in too low environmental standards and taxes. We develop a theoretical model and show that if the median voter cares sufficiently for the environment, she has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares more for the environment than she does herself. By doing so, she mitigates the`race to the bottom' in environmental taxes. In contrast, if environmental policies are determined cooperatively with other countries, the median voter has an incentive to delegate policy making to a politician that cares less for the environment than she does herself, so as to free ride on international environmental agreements.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 53 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 270-275

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:53:y:2007:i:2:p:270-275

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Perino, Grischa, 2010. "How delegation improves commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(2), pages 137-139, February.
  2. Leo Wangler & JJuan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2011. "The Political Economy of International Environmental Agreements: A Survey," Jena Economic Research Papers 2011-038, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  3. Keisuke Hattori, 2010. "Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(4), pages 459-474, August.
  4. Kimiko Terai, 2012. "Financial Mechanism and Enforceability of International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(2), pages 297-308, October.
  5. Xiao Chen & Alan Woodland, 2013. "International trade and climate change," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 381-413, June.
  6. Habla, Wolfgang & Winkler, Ralph, 2013. "Political influence on non-cooperative international climate policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 219-234.
  7. B. Andrew Chupp, 2011. "Spillovers and Taxes: What Drives Strategic Competition in Environmental Policies?," Working Paper Series 20110402, Illinois State University, Department of Economics.
  8. Martin Gregor & Lenka Stastna, 2012. "The decentralization tradeoff for complementary spillovers," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 41-69, March.
  9. Robert Hahn & Robert Ritz, 2014. "Optimal Altruism in Public Good Provision," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1403, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
  10. Katarina Elofsson, 2011. "Delegation of Decision-Rights for Wetlands," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 50(2), pages 285-303, October.
  11. Per G. Fredriksson & Xenia Matschke & Jenny Minier, 2008. "Environmental Policy in Majoritarian Systems," Working papers 2008-01, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2009.
  12. Keisuke Hattori & Takahiro Kitamura, 2013. "Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 55(2), pages 199-215, June.
  13. Fredriksson, Per G. & Wang, Le & Mamun, Khawaja A., 2011. "Are politicians office or policy motivated? The case of U.S. governors' environmental policies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 241-253, September.
  14. Kimiko Terai, 2008. "International Coordination and Domestic Politics," Working Papers 080907, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
  15. R. Emre Aytimur & Aristotelis Boukouras & Robert Schwager, 2012. "The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control," CESifo Working Paper Series 3900, CESifo Group Munich.

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