Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Analysis
AbstractThis paper takes a fresh look at the trade-off between centralized and decentralized provision of local public goods. The point of departure is to model a centralized system as one in which public spending is financed by general taxation, but districts can receive different levels of local public goods. In a world of benevolent governments, the disadvantages of centralization stressed in the existing literature disappear, suggesting that the case for decentralization must be driven by political economy considerations. Our political economy analysis assumes that under decentralization public goods are selected by locally elected representatives, while under a centralized system policy choices are determined by a legislature consisting of elected representatives from each district. We then study the role of taste heterogeneity, spillovers and legislative behavior in determining the case for centralization.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 7084.
Date of creation: Apr 1999
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. "Centralized Versus Decentralized Provision Of Local Public Goods: A Political Economy Approach," Journal of Public Economics, 2003, v87(12,Dec), 2611-2637.
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Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
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Other versions of this item:
- Besley, Timothy J. & Coate, Stephen, 2000. "Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: a Political Economy Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 2495, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
- D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-1999-04-27 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-1999-04-27 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-1999-04-27 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENV-1999-04-27 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-IND-1999-04-27 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MIC-1999-04-27 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-1999-04-27 (Public Economics)
- NEP-PKE-1999-04-27 (Post Keynesian Economics)
- NEP-POL-1999-04-27 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-PUB-1999-04-27 (Public Finance)
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