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Strategic Voting for Noncooperative Environmental Policies in Open Economies

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  • Hattori, Keisuke

Abstract

In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of international noncooperative environmental policymaking, and examine the strategic incentives for voters to elect an environmental policymaker in open economies. We show that under several circumstances, citizens have an incentive to deliberately vote for a candidate whose environmental preferences differ from their own. Further, the strategic voting incentives are crucially depend on the environmental policy tools employed by the government, the international market structures, and the degree of product differentiation among firms.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6333.

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Date of creation: 18 Dec 2007
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6333

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Keywords: strategic voting; the race to the bottom; market structure; environmental policy;

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Cited by:
  1. Kimiko Terai, 2012. "Financial Mechanism and Enforceability of International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(2), pages 297-308, October.
  2. Hattori, Keisuke & Kitamura, Takahiro, 2011. "Endogenous Timing in Strategic Environmental Policymaking," MPRA Paper 29337, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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