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Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly

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  • Jonathan Eaton
  • Gene M. Grossman

Abstract

In this paper we provide an integrative treatment of the welfare effects of trade and industrial policy under oligopoly, and characterize qualitatively the form that optimal intervention takes under a variety of assumptions about the number of firms, their conjectures about the response of their rivals to their actions, the substitutability of their productsand the markets in which they are sold. We find that when no domestic consumption occurs optimal policy under duopoly with a single home firm depends on the difference between firms' actual responses to their rivals and the response that their rivals' conjecture. If conjectures are consistent ,free trade is optimal. A tax or subsidy is indicated depending on the sign of the difference between the conjectured and the actual reponse.With more than one home firm but still no domestic consumption, an export tax is indicated if conjectures are consistent. Production subsidies and export tax-cum-subsidies can raise national welfare in the presence of domestic consumption, because these policies can mitigate the extent of the consumption distortion implicit in the deviation of price from marginal cost.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 1236.

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Date of creation: Nov 1983
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Publication status: published as Eaton, Jonathan and Gene M. Grossman. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy Under Oligopoly." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 101, No. 2, (May 1986), pp. 383-406.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:1236

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  1. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 518, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  2. Martin K. Perry, 1982. "Oligopoly and Consistent Conjectural Variations," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 197-205, Spring.
  3. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "Tariff Protection and Imperfect Competition," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 517, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  4. Morton I. Kamien & Nancy L. Schwartz, 1983. "Conjectural Variations," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(2), pages 191-211, May.
  5. Dixit, Avinash, 1984. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 1-16, Supplemen.
  6. Seade, Jesus K, 1980. "On the Effects of Entry," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 479-89, March.
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