Optimal policies with strategic distortions
AbstractRecent work in optimal trade policy for imperfectly competitive markets usually identifies the optimal level of an instrument, and when more instruments are allowed, general interpretations have been unavailable, This paper analyzes the jointly optimal levels of a Variety of instruments with oligopolistic competition. A targeting principle for identifying optimal policies is derived using the concept of a "strategic distortion." It is shown how optimal policies vary with the distortions present and the number of firms, as well as assumptions about market segmentation and regulation. The principles of targeting are illustrated using agricultural marketing boards.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.
Volume (Year): 31 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (November)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552
Other versions of this item:
- Kala Krishna & Marie Thursby, 1988. "Optimal Policies with Strategic Distortions," NBER Working Papers 2527, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Krishna, K. & Thursby, M., 1991. "Optimal Polocies with Strategic Distortions," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1004, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984.
"Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry,"
NBER Working Papers
1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
- Markusen, James R., 1984. "The welfare and allocative effects of export taxes versus marketing boards," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 19-36.
- Just, Richard E & Schmitz, Andrew & Zilberman, David, 1979. "Price Controls and Optimal Export Policies under Alternative Market Structures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 706-14, September.
- Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982.
"International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy,"
518, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Spencer, Barbara J & Brander, James A, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 707-22, October.
- Krishna, Kala & Itoh, Motoshige, 1988.
"Content Protection and Oligopolistic Interactions,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(1), pages 107-25, January.
- Auquier, A A & Caves, R E, 1979. "Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and Optimal Competition Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 559-81, September.
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