Public Policy In Vertically Related Markets: A Cournot Oligopoly-Oligopsony Model
AbstractWe use a partial equilibrium two-country model, with two vertically related markets, with perfect competition in the primary good sector and with a fixed number of processing firms in each country, characterized by a Cournot behavior upstream and downstream. In the first stage of the game, the government of the exporting country chooses the level of price instruments on both goods. The targeting principle is used to characterize optimal intervention in presence of a minimum revenue constraint towards primary producers. Keywords: vertically related markets, imperfect
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN with number 21561.
Date of creation: 1999
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More information through EDIRC
vertically related markets; imperfect competition; Industrial Organization; International Relations/Trade; F1; H2; L1; Q1;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture
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