Optimal trade and industrial policies are derived for a home market that is supplied by a domestic firm and a foreign firm. The optimal policy combination can be quite sensitive to the nature of the duopoly's competition. For example, for some cost and demand s tructures, the optimal policy under Cournot competition consists of a domestic production tax and a tariff, but that under Bertrand compet ition consists of a production subsidy and free trade. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.
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Volume (Year): 78 (1988) Issue (Month): 4 (September) Pages: 746-58 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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