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Optimal Polocies with Strategic Distortions

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  • KRISHNA, K.
  • THURSBY, M.

Abstract

Recent work in optimal trade policy for imperfectly competitive markets usually identifies the optimal level of an instrument, and when more instruments are allowed, general interpretations have been unavailable, This paper analyzes the jointly optimal levels of a Variety of instruments with oligopolistic competition. A targeting principle for identifying optimal policies is derived using the concept of a "strategic distortion." It is shown how optimal policies vary with the distortions present and the number of firms, as well as assumptions about market segmentation and regulation. The principles of targeting are illustrated using agricultural marketing boards.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1004.

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Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1004

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Keywords: market ; competition ; trade policy ; regulations;

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References

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  1. James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1984. "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry," NBER Working Papers 1464, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Dixit, Avinash, 1984. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 1-16, Supplemen.
  3. Auquier, A A & Caves, R E, 1979. "Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and Optimal Competition Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 559-81, September.
  4. Just, Richard E & Schmitz, Andrew & Zilberman, David, 1979. "Price Controls and Optimal Export Policies under Alternative Market Structures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 706-14, September.
  5. Kala Krishna & Motoshige Itoh, 1986. "Content Protection and Oligopolistic Interactions," NBER Working Papers 1843, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Barbara J. Spencer & James A. Brander, 1982. "International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 518, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  7. Martin K. Perry, 1982. "Oligopoly and Consistent Conjectural Variations," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 197-205, Spring.
  8. Markusen, James R., 1984. "The welfare and allocative effects of export taxes versus marketing boards," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 19-36.
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