Optimal Polocies with Strategic Distortions
AbstractRecent work in optimal trade policy for imperfectly competitive markets usually identifies the optimal level of an instrument, and when more instruments are allowed, general interpretations have been unavailable, This paper analyzes the jointly optimal levels of a Variety of instruments with oligopolistic competition. A targeting principle for identifying optimal policies is derived using the concept of a "strategic distortion." It is shown how optimal policies vary with the distortions present and the number of firms, as well as assumptions about market segmentation and regulation. The principles of targeting are illustrated using agricultural marketing boards.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Purdue University, Department of Economics in its series Purdue University Economics Working Papers with number 1004.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
market ; competition ; trade policy ; regulations;
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