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Optimal Policies with Strategic Distortions

  • Kala Krishna
  • Marie Thursby

Recent work in optimal trade policy for imperfectly competitive markets usually identifies the optimal level of an instrument, and when more instruments are allowed, general interpretations have been unavailable, This paper analyzes the jointly optimal levels of a Variety of instruments with oligopolistic competition. A targeting principle for identifying optimal policies is derived using the concept of a "strategic distortion." It is shown how optimal policies vary with the distortions present and the number of firms, as well as assumptions about market segmentation and regulation. The principles of targeting are illustrated using agricultural marketing boards.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w2527.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 2527.

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Date of creation: Mar 1988
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Journal of International Economics Volume 31, 1991, pp. 291-308
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:2527
Note: ITI IFM
Contact details of provider: Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
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  1. Dixit, Avinash, 1984. "International Trade Policy for Oligopolistic Industries," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376a), pages 1-16, Supplemen.
  2. Kala Krishna & Motoshige Itoh, 1986. "Content Protection and Oligopolistic Interactions," NBER Working Papers 1843, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Spencer, Barbara J & Brander, James A, 1983. "International R & D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 707-22, October.
  4. Martin K. Perry, 1982. "Oligopoly and Consistent Conjectural Variations," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(1), pages 197-205, Spring.
  5. Auquier, A A & Caves, R E, 1979. "Monopolistic Export Industries, Trade Taxes, and Optimal Competition Policy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(355), pages 559-81, September.
  6. Brander, James A. & Spencer, Barbara J., 1985. "Export subsidies and international market share rivalry," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1-2), pages 83-100, February.
  7. Markusen, James R., 1984. "The welfare and allocative effects of export taxes versus marketing boards," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 19-36.
  8. Just, Richard E & Schmitz, Andrew & Zilberman, David, 1979. "Price Controls and Optimal Export Policies under Alternative Market Structures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 706-14, September.
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