A comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards

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A comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards

Author Info

Costinot, Arnaud

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Arnaud Costinot

Abstract

The WTO and the EU have chosen two different agreements on product standards. While the WTO's approach is primarily based on a "National Treatment" (NT) principle, the EU's approach crucially relies on a principle of "Mutual Recognition" (MR). This paper offers a first look at the comparative performance of these two principles. We show that standards are imposed for levels of externalities that are too low under NT and too high under MR. This suggests that NT should be preferred to MR when the amount of trade in goods characterized by high levels of externalities is large.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of International Economics.

Volume (Year): 75 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 197-213
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Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:75:y:2008:i:1:p:197-213

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Paper
- Arnaud Costinot, 2008. "A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Agreements on Product Standards," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2008-05, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]

References listed on IDEAS
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Other versions:
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repec:cup:cbooks:9780521671422 is not listed on IDEAS
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Other versions:
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Horn, Henrik & Maggi, Giovanni & Staiger, Robert, 2007. "Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 6037, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Horn, Henrik & Maggi, Giovanni & Staiger, Rikard W., 2007. "Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts," Working Paper Series 689, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Henrik Horn & Giovanni Maggi & Robert W. Staiger, 2006. "Trade Agreements as Endogenously Incomplete Contracts," NBER Working Papers 12745, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Vitor Trindade & Johannes Moenius, 2007. "Networks, Standards and Intellectual Property Rights," Working Papers 0705, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]

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